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AbsTrACT
Public health and service delivery programmes, 
interventions and policies (collectively, ’programmes’) 
are typically developed and implemented for the 
primary purpose of effecting change rather than 
generating knowledge. Nonetheless, evaluations of these 
programmes may produce valuable learning that helps 
determine effectiveness and costs as well as informing 
design and implementation of future programmes. Such 
studies might be termed ’opportunistic evaluations’, 
since they are responsive to emergent opportunities 
rather than being studies of interventions that are 
initiated or designed by researchers. However, current 
ethical guidance and registration procedures make 
little allowance for scenarios where researchers have 
played no role in the development or implementation 
of a programme, but nevertheless plan to conduct a 
prospective evaluation. We explore the limitations of the 
guidance and procedures with respect to opportunistic 
evaluations, providing a number of examples. We 
propose that one key missing distinction in current 
guidance is moral responsibility: researchers can only be 
held accountable for those aspects of a study over which 
they have control. We argue that requiring researchers 
to justify an intervention, programme or policy that 
would occur regardless of their involvement prevents or 
hinders research in the public interest without providing 
any further protections to research participants. We 
recommend that trial consent and ethics procedures 
allow for a clear separation of responsibilities for the 
intervention and the evaluation.
InTrOduCTIOn
In this article, we focus on the ethics of a distinctive 
type of study: evaluations of programmes, initia-
tives, policies and interventions that would occur 
whether or not any research activity was taking 
place. That is to say, in these cases the research is not 
the cause, in a counterfactual sense, of the interven-
tion being applied to human subjects. The primary 
goal, from the perspective of the leaders and the 
organisations initiating and implementing the activ-
ities, which we will collectively term ‘programmes’, 
is to make change and improvement, not to produce 
knowledge. The impetus for the activity may arise 
external to organisations (eg, in response to policy 
or contractual changes, opportunities to work in 
national programmes, and so on), or internally (eg, 
in response to discovery of a problem or regulatory 
finding, through service improvement agendas, and 
so on).
These kinds of programmes are very common. 
They range from large-scale service reconfigura-
tions and pathway redesign through to more local 
changes in appointment systems, supply chains and 
operating theatre scheduling. Current UK examples 
include the Getting It Right First Time programme, 
which seeks to reduce unwarranted clinical varia-
tions with ~£60 million funding,1 and the roll-out 
of the National Early Warning Score system2 to 
improve detection and response to deteriorating 
patients in hospitals. In these cases, healthcare 
organisations will be initiating the programmes 
anyway, but opportunistic evaluations conducted 
alongside them have the potential to advance 
knowledge about programme design, implementa-
tion, mechanisms of change and outcomes.
Thus, though researchers may have no role what-
soever in the development and implementation of 
these programmes, they may have a very important 
role in evaluating them. In this article, we propose 
that current ethical guidelines for the conduct of 
research are a barrier to prospective evaluations of 
programmes that are independent of researchers. 
Specifically, guidelines act as a hindrance because 
they assume that researchers have responsibility for 
factors over which, in reality, they have no control. 
In particular, we shall be arguing that some of the 
principles outlined in the Ottawa statement on 
cluster randomised trials3 should be relaxed when 
researchers evaluate an intervention that will occur 
regardless of any study. We propose that, as a basic 
principle, researchers cannot be held responsible 
for programmes that they are not accountable for, 
that are not attributable to their involvement and 
that they have no control over.
OppOrTunIsTIC evAluATIOns
Done well and systematically, evaluative studies 
that are conducted alongside programmes that are 
happening anyway serve the interests of patients, 
the public and the healthcare system by producing 
systematic knowledge about the fate and impact of 
improvement and change programmes.4 We term 
these studies ‘opportunistic evaluations’, and define 
them as follows:
Opportunistic evaluations study programmes, 
initiatives, policies, and interventions that would 
occur whether or not there were any concurrent, 
coincident, or otherwise related research activities 
designed to produce knowledge from the programme. 
Opportunistic evaluations are systematic studies that 
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make use of naturally arising opportunities to study the effects and 
costs of those programmes and how they work.
Opportunistic evaluations can make invaluable contributions 
to advancing knowledge about programme design, implementa-
tion, mechanisms of change and outcomes. For example, they 
can assist with determining effectiveness, identifying the influ-
ences on effectiveness, characterise the mechanisms of action, 
support replication and scaling of successful programmes, and 
reduce waste and costs associated with unsuccessful programmes 
by demonstrating what should not be supported in the future. It 
is especially important that initiatives and programmes be eval-
uated if they are novel, expensive, have the potential for signifi-
cant impact, or there are plausible reasons to evaluate them in a 
new context.5 6 In such situations, there is a strong public interest 
argument for evaluation.
The Ottawa statement on the ethical design and conduct of 
cluster randomised trials,3 however, makes little of acknowl-
edgement of a scenario where the researchers have not initiated 
the programme. For example, it draws on the principle of clin-
ical equipoise to require researchers to ‘ensure that the study 
intervention is adequately justified.’ While this might be an 
appropriate safeguard when researchers design interventions for 
purposes of generating new knowledge, it is unduly restrictive 
when the intervention is wholly owned in the service. Indeed, 
the public interest in evaluating an intervention may arise 
because there is a lack of equipoise. For example, in the USA 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services recently invited 
states to establish work requirements for Medicaid benefits. A 
number of physician organisations and other groups have argued 
that these requirements are likely to lead to financial and health 
harms for patients.7 Prospectively examining the impact of this 
policy is essential to fully informing future debate.
The point that interventions may not be initiated by researchers 
but nonetheless warrant study is exemplified by the demand for 
evaluation from those who have designed, commissioned or 
implemented programmes and policies and the usefulness of the 
evidence such evaluations generate. As an example, 24 hospi-
tals across the UK participated in the Safer Patients Programme, 
which was commissioned by the Health Foundation, a UK char-
itable foundation. Those hospitals took part in the programme 
in order to improve their systems, practices and culture—not to 
produce knowledge. An evaluation of the programme did not 
change anything that the organisations were going to do anyway, 
but it did show that, on average, those organisations did not 
improve more than organisations that were not participating 
in the programme, thus producing very useful learning about 
whether the programme was a suitable candidate for investment 
by the National Health Service (NHS).8 9
Another example is the evaluation of the reconfiguration of 
stroke services in two major UK cities: London and Manchester. 
The evaluation again was wrapped around a programme that 
was happening anyway, and produced important learning about 
centralised models, showing that they can reduce mortality and 
length of stay.10 The evaluation of the Mexican Progresa/Opor-
tunidades programme, which included conditional cash transfers 
for certain health and educational outcomes, provides another 
illustration. Randomisation was built into the government’s 
implementation of the programme to enable experimental eval-
uation without affecting the policy itself or the eventual recipi-
ents. A great deal of valuable research has been published on the 
basis of this roll-out and subsequent follow-up studies on the 
effects of conditional cash transfer programmes, which now over 
60 countries implement.11
A defining feature of opportunistic evaluations, in these 
kinds of scenarios, is that those studying the programme do not 
control the change under study: the evaluators do not conceive 
of, initiate, deliver, or affect the programme of interventions or 
other changes. Yet current governance and ethics requirements 
may be problematic or ill suited to the goals either of evaluation 
or to organisations-seeking improvement, since they typically 
assume that the evaluator is controlling many more aspects of 
the programme than is usually the case.
sTudy desIgns fOr OppOrTunIsTIC evAluATIOns
In identifying the challenges associated with opportunistic evalu-
ations, it is useful first to expand on what constitutes an ‘oppor-
tunistic evaluation’. When a programme is designed and led by 
researchers, even if implemented by policymakers, the researcher 
bears responsibility, and the normal rules of ethical engagement 
should apply. For instance, a service innovation to test an inter-
vention to provide more patient-centred care12 clearly falls into 
this category, since the participating professionals and organisa-
tions would not have implemented it without a research project. 
Our concern is not with these researcher-led programmes, 
but where the researcher has not designed or initiated the 
programme. The distinction has analogies with the distinction 
between prospective and retrospective studies.
With a retrospective study of a programme not initiated by 
a researcher, the programme lies in the past and the researcher 
cannot be assumed to have responsibility for it. Nevertheless, 
these studies can take advantage of the opportunities afforded 
by how programmes were rolled out. For example, the lottery 
mechanism used to allocate limited sign-up opportunities for 
Medicaid in Oregon, USA, afforded researchers an opportu-
nity to examine the effects of healthcare coverage that took 
advantage of a randomisation process that had been deployed 
for reasons other than research, and over which the researchers 
had no control.13 14 Likewise, allocation of permits by lottery to 
allow Fijians to emigrate to New Zealand allowed researchers 
to study the effects of migration on health and well-being many 
years later.15 16 Other studies may take the form of natural exper-
iments: observational studies where a researcher ‘can make 
a credible claim that the assignment of the nonexperimental 
subjects to treatment and control conditions is ‘as if ’ random.’17 
For instance, a study in Canada of the impact of a pay-for-per-
formance scheme, where some but not all of the physicians were 
exposed to the incentives, allowed a quasiexperimental evalua-
tion where no aspect of the assignment of the physicians to the 
programme was controlled by the researchers.18
Retrospective evaluations of programmes that have already 
occurred clearly absolve researchers from responsibility for the 
programme itself, but they do not absolve researchers of ethical 
responsibility for the research activities they conduct. As for all 
studies, researchers must obtain ethics committee approval for 
all the things that they plan to do in their roles as researchers: 
data collection, analysis, protection of rights of participants, 
and so on. They have unassailable duties to protect anonymity, 
properly interpret data and avoid ‘over-claiming’. They must not 
fabricate or plagiarise data, and should place their work in the 
public domain.
These obligations apply equally to prospective studies of 
programmes that are not researcher initiated. Prospective study 
designs are often highly beneficial to science and learning. They 
may, for example, enable hypotheses to be specified a priori, thus 
mitigating the risks of data-driven comparisons. Evaluators can 
support augmentation of the information to be collected—for 
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example, qualitative data to explicate implementation fidelity, 
or surveys of participants’ views, thus maximising the learning 
from the programme. A statistical analysis plan can also be 
specified, thus enhancing transparency and rigour. However, a 
number of ambiguities complicate clarity about the ethical duties 
of the evaluators in prospective opportunistic evaluations, which 
vary somewhat across two types of study.
In the first, the evaluator has no influence on the programme 
at all, but uses available data and the design of the programme 
to mount a study prospectively. As an example, an opportunistic 
evaluation of the 7 Day Services policy implemented across the 
NHS in England and Wales, which aimed to increase specialist 
availability in hospitals at the weekend, is examining a policy 
that was designed and implemented by the Department of 
Health and NHS England independently of the evaluation. The 
evaluation involves a review of patient case notes from before 
and after the policy implementation alongside qualitative studies 
during the implementation itself.19
The second study type is one where the programme is not 
initiated by researchers but they help to design the implementa-
tion (not the intervention) in a way that facilitates evaluation, for 
example, by proposing to programme leaders that study design 
such as wait-list, stepped-wedge or cluster randomised designs 
be adopted in situations where use of such strategies is consistent 
with the goals of the programme. This approach is often true 
when a programme cannot be rolled out to all possible sites at 
once, and much scientific value can be obtained by the order of 
roll-out to be determined at random.20 Importantly, though, this 
still meets our definition of an opportunistic evaluation in that 
the intervention would still occur without the involvement of 
researchers. Such was the case with the aforementioned Progresa/
Oportunidades programme, a poverty alleviation programme in 
Mexico, which incorporated a randomised implementation to 
permit rigorous evaluation.11 Another example was the evalua-
tion of the Matching Michigan programme in the English NHS, 
which incorporated a stepped (although non-random) roll-out.21
Very often, the most convenient and robust prospective study 
design for programmes involves allocation of interventions at the 
cluster level (eg, village, school, hospital ward) rather than the 
individual level. In the current literature, including the Ottawa 
declaration, cluster randomised studies are considered to pose 
distinctive ethical issues.22 However, many of these issues are not 
relevant to opportunistic evaluations, since there is little that is 
ethically fraught about randomising roll-out in a situation where 
every site is going to receive the programme anyway, where they 
cannot all receive it at once and where the role of the researchers 
is to support roll-out in a manner that optimises learning.
eThICAl debATes AbOuT ClusTer rAndOmIsATIOn
The most influential guidance on the ethics of cluster randomisa-
tion is found in the Ottawa Statement on the design and conduct 
of cluster randomised trials.3 Its emphases are largely consistent 
with most current codifications of ethical practice,23–26 yet they 
make for a remarkably poor fit with the realities of opportunistic 
evaluations.
One evident problem is that the Ottawa statement calls on 
the researcher to justify the rationale for the intervention and 
demonstrate equipoise.3 But, for opportunistic evaluations, the 
researchers may not be well placed to supply the rationale (after 
all, it is not their choice), much less justify it, especially since 
their role may be one of surfacing the rationale and assessing its 
soundness.27
The Ottawa declaration also holds that the researcher is 
responsible for obtaining informed consent for the interven-
tion from participants or if the intervention has minimal harm, 
obtain a waiver of consent. However, it should not be assumed 
that planned programmes are free of an a priori expectation of 
harm from the intervention. Consider again the Medicaid work 
requirements policy discussed above. A waiver of consent would 
not be granted for this intervention; indeed, it is unlikely partic-
ipants would even consent to the intervention, and yet it would 
still occur regardless of the consent process for research. While 
the researcher can properly be held responsible for obtaining 
informed consent for any data collection for research purposes, 
this responsibility should not extend to the intervention itself, 
since it is implemented under a policy or leadership mandate—it 
would be strange indeed for a researcher to seek consent from 
members of a cluster for an intervention that the policymaker 
had decided to introduce regardless of any evaluation.
It has also been argued that researchers must justify the choice 
of control condition in cluster studies.3 22 While it is correct that 
the researcher, given a choice of possible controls, should select 
the controls to maximise their scientific value, the researcher 
cannot be held responsible for the fact that controls have not 
received the intervention, since it is the policymaker, not the 
researcher, who decides where and when to intervene (and 
where not to do so). As such, controls may not meet the high 
standard of a trial where the researcher has full control of all 
aspects of the intervention. Insisting that the intervention must 
receive ethical approval simply because it is part of an evalu-
ative study does not solve the problem. It would be perverse 
if, by agreeing to an evaluation of an intervention, a govern-
ment minister claiming a democratic mandate or a hospital chief 
acting on behalf of their board, then had to subject the interven-
tion to a research ethics committee, when they could otherwise 
proceed unhindered: an example of the adage that ‘you can do 
anything you like, as long as you promise not to learn from it.’
The consequences of the poor alignment between ethical 
recommendations and the specificities of improvement evalu-
ations are highly practical and far reaching. For instance, the 
assumption that the researcher controls any prospectively eval-
uated intervention is so strongly entrenched that it is difficult to 
register an evaluation of a policymaker’s intervention on  Clini-
calTrials. gov, the first, largest and most widely used clinical trials 
registry.28 If individuals are not ‘assigned by an investigator… 
to receive specific interventions,’ then the study must be classi-
fied as observational, according to their guidelines. Moreover, 
having entered ‘observational’ the study cannot then be classified 
as prospective, but must be classified as retrospective in order to 
be accepted by the system. Thus, a prospective stepped-wedge 
randomised controlled trial in which researcher involvement 
with the intervention and its implementation is limited only to 
randomising the order of units in the roll-out must be classified 
as a retrospective, observational study. The implication is that an 
investigator cannot mount a prospective study of an interven-
tion implemented by a policymaker or programme leader. The 
pre-registration of a trial is an essential component to ensuring 
its validity. The impossibility of registering the type of study we 
describe here on the largest trials registry is indicative of the lack 
of consideration given to the ‘grey area’ of opportunistic evalua-
tion and further serves as another hindrance to conducting valid 
studies with appropriate oversight.
Negotiating through these ambiguities leads to delays that may 
be highly consequential for real-time improvement programmes, 
to queries at organisation level about cost recovery (because 
of the difficulties of distinguishing programme activities from 
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Box 1 An integrated community health worker programme
Community health workers (CHW) are lay community members 
trained to provide advice and support ongoing care for a range of 
conditions, and are an integral part of healthcare delivery in low/
middle-income countries. One non-governmental organisation, 
known as Partners In Health (PIH), provides healthcare 
infrastructure, programmes and personnel in Neno District in 
Malawi.
In conjunction with PIH, our research team are evaluating the 
effects of a programme that changes the organisation, role and 
activities of the CHWs.35 The roll-out of the new CHW model was 
already planned to be staggered over time between six study 
sites (clusters) selected by PIH to ensure training feasibility. To 
avoid the perception of catchment area favouritism, PIH decided 
to randomise the order in which clusters would receive the 
intervention, and the research conducted the randomisation. The 
research team also conducts the statistical analyses using data 
routinely collected by the CHWs, the health centres and the Ministry 
of Health. In collaboration with PIH, the research team designed 
what data should be analysed and how. PIH sought and received 
ethical approval to implement the change to CHW provision and 
permissions to evaluate its effects using routinely collected data. The 
ethical responsibilities of the researchers comprised data sharing 
and management, and justification of the analyses, but not the 
intervention or its implementation. Ethical permission was sought 
on these grounds.
evaluation activity) and to inappropriate requirements for local 
collaborators/principal investigators. Before we suggest how this 
difficulty might be avoided, we need to examine the ethical prin-
ciple on which we shall rely.
eThICs Of OppOrTunIsTIC evAluATIOns
Many of the problems we describe above are not resolved by 
classifying opportunistic evaluations as audit, quality improve-
ment, or service evaluation, which the UK Health Research 
Authority specifies as comprising projects which are ‘designed 
and conducted solely to define or judge current care.’29 Such 
projects may not have sufficiently robust governance or ethical 
oversight and are subject to widely varying local arrangements. 
A further important problem is that where opportunistic evalua-
tions are not classified as research, the ability to publish findings 
and accumulate knowledge is undermined, and the credibility 
and impact of the evaluation on practice and policy is weak-
ened. Yet a significant percentage of evaluations are classified 
as ‘service evaluations’: Chen and Fawcett note that South East 
Scotland Research Ethics Service estimates it gave advice on 
1300 studies between 2010 and 2015 of which 70% were classi-
fied as ‘not research’.30 This is not to say that all studies should 
be classified as research, merely that there is strong reason to 
believe that too many studies are classified as non-research in 
order to avoid certain regulatory or ethical barriers.
Once it is determined that an opportunistic evaluation counts 
as research, our basic principle is that a person can only assume 
(moral) responsibility, or be held accountable, for something 
that occurs as a result of their action (or absence of action).31 
The responsibility for an intervention therefore lies with those 
whose action led to the intervention being designed and imple-
mented. Clinical innovators, such as clinicians or pharmaceutical 
companies, are held accountable through strict ethical scrutiny, 
which grants authority to intervene.22 32 The authority of those 
who initiate improvement and change programmes is different, 
deriving, for example, from democratic mandate. In contrast, 
the researcher can only bear responsibility for, and hence 
requires scrutiny for, an intervention when she has participated 
in designing or implementing it. This position derives from the 
Kantian principle that ‘ought implies can’33: to be held account-
able, a moral agent must know of the standards she is expected 
to meet, be charged with responsibility for meeting those stan-
dards, and have sufficient autonomy and capacity in her choice 
of actions, and access to resources, to be able to comply. When 
a researcher is unable to influence programme design or imple-
mentation, she is not accountable for it.
We propose that, for opportunistic evaluations, the poli-
cymaker/programme leader is responsible for the design and 
implementation of the programme: the evaluator is not (she has 
other responsibilities, but not for the programme). A concep-
tual litmus test would be to determine what would occur in the 
counterfactual scenario of no evaluation taking place. If, in the 
absence of evaluation, the implementation proceeds in the same 
way, it follows that the researcher should not be the responsible 
agent when it comes to programmes.
This is, of course, not to argue that a researcher qua researcher 
can simply abandon their obligations qua morally responsible 
agent. One challenge arises, for example, in circumstances when 
it might be morally indefensible for researchers to conduct an 
evaluation at all—for example, when a programme is highly 
likely or certain to cause significant or severe harm—because of 
the risk that the evaluation of a programme might vicariously 
endorse an immoral act. The question of whether a researcher 
ought to participate in a given evaluation is one that should be 
judged on a case-by-case basis, given that an evaluation might be 
ethical even if a programme is not (since the evaluation may, for 
instance, evidence harm that would otherwise remain concealed). 
The key point, for purposes of our argument, is that the current 
ethical guidance for cluster trials requires that the evaluation and 
intervention be justified on grounds of equipoise, minimal harm, 
and so forth, which would rule out many potentially beneficial 
evaluations of programmes. Given evidence that implementation 
of an untested policy based on intuition about what works may 
be less likely to invite objection from the public than rigorous 
evaluation of two or more otherwise unobjectionable policies,34 
the risk is that policymakers or others continue to see imposing 
a programme on the whole population without evaluation as less 
problematic (and less trouble) than introducing it for half, and 
learning in the process. To safeguard the public interest, a new 
approach to the ethics of opportunistic evaluations is needed. 
We propose that the approvals necessary for a researcher should 
be limited only to factors over which the researcher has control. 
We provide an example of the prospective evaluation of an inter-
vention deployed by policymakers in box 1.
COnClusIOns
When evaluating service delivery or policy interventions, 
researchers may not have control over design and implementa-
tion of the programme or selection of sites. Where evaluation 
can be decoupled from the programme/intervention, clarity is 
needed about how to define and allocate responsibility. Requiring 
researchers to seek approvals for aspects of a programme that 
they have not initiated and do not control may obstruct, inter-
fere with or prevent important research and learning without 
providing any further protections to research participants. 
We recommend that the Ottawa declaration, trial registration 
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processes and other relevant guidelines should be reviewed as a 
matter of some urgency to address this challenge.
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